Essential SIEM Rules to Start With

No activity outside business hours rules, no password policy modification rules, or other actions irrelevant to real-time threat detection.


Credential-Based Attacks

Detect bruteforce attacks (repeated failed logins to a single account) and password spraying (one password tested across multiple accounts).

Why: Common initial access vectors due to weak credentials.

Coverage:

  • OS/Apps: Windows (AD), Linux, cloud services (AWS/Azure).

  • Events: Logon failures (Windows Event ID 4625), successful logons (ID 4624), user_start/user_login syscalls.

  • Logic: Threshold-based alerts (e.g., ≥5 failed logins/minute from a single IP).

Improvements:

  • Trigger alerts for successful logins after multiple failures.

  • Differentiate brute-force (single account) vs. spraying (multiple accounts).

  • Reduce false positives:

    • Exclude service accounts with expired passwords.

    • Split by application type (e.g., email clients often trigger false alerts).


Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Detect exploitation of code execution vulnerabilities, regardless of the specific CVE.

Coverage:

  • OS: Windows, Linux.

  • Events: Process creation (Windows Event ID 4688, Sysmon Event ID 1/11; Linux execve/open syscalls).

  • Logic:

    • Suspicious parent-child process chains (e.g., w3wp.execmd.exe).

    • Code execution by service accounts (e.g., www-data, apache).

    • Web-shell creation in web directories (e.g., .php, .aspx files).

Improvements:

  • Use whitelists for legitimate application behaviors.

  • Split into sub-rules:

    1. Abnormal process sequences.

    2. Service account anomalies.

    3. Web-shell file creation.


Phishing Payload Execution

Focus on post-exploitation behavior rather than email analysis.

Coverage:

  • OS: Windows.

  • Events: Process creation (Event ID 4688, Sysmon 1).

  • Logic:

    • Office apps (e.g., winword.exe) spawning shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe).

    • Processes downloading/executing external payloads.

Limitations:

  • Misses password-protected ZIP/RAR payloads.

  • Bypassed via indirect execution (e.g., some macros break the process chain).

Improvements:

  • Monitor Office apps writing executables to disk.


Privilege Escalation

Detect transitions from user to SYSTEM/root privileges.

Coverage:

  • OS: Windows.

  • Events: Process creation (Event ID 4688, Sysmon 1).

  • Logic:

    • User-context parent process spawning SYSTEM-level child (e.g., juicypotato.exe, print spooler exploits).

Unix Variant:

  • Monitor auid (original user) vs. euid=0 (root execution).

Limitations:

  • Misses privilege escalation via service creation. Or any other indirect execution.


DCSync Attacks

Detect unauthorized replication of AD database via Mimikatz, Impacket Secretsdump or similar tools.

Coverage:

  • OS: Windows (Active Directory).

  • Events: Directory Service replication (Event ID 4662).

  • Logic:

    • Replication requests from non-DC hosts or non-admin accounts. The logis is well-known. Here is the example.

Improvements:

  • Monitor changes to replication-permitted groups (e.g., Domain Admins).

  • Baseline legitimate DC-to-DC replication traffic.


Living Off the Land (LOLBAS/GTFOBins)

Detect abuse of trusted binaries (e.g., certutil.exe, bitsadmin).

Coverage:

  • OS: Windows, Linux.

  • Events: Process execution logs.

  • Logic:

    • Command-line patterns matching LOLBAS/GTFOBins techniques.

Improvements:


Hacking Tool Detection

Flag known security tools (e.g., Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, Metasploit).

Coverage:

  • OS: Windows, Linux.

  • Events: Process creation, command-line arguments.

  • Logic:

    • Match process names, hashes, or CLI patterns against threat intel feeds or CLI patterns matching tools like PowerSploit, Empire.


Host Reconnaissance

Detect post-compromise discovery commands (e.g., whoami, nslookup).

Coverage:

  • OS: Windows, Linux.

  • Events: Process execution logs.

  • Logic:

    • Commands associated with TTPs from MITRE ATT&CK® TA0007.

    • Commands from Red Team cheat sheets.

Improvements:

  • Prioritize commands run by non-admin users in sensitive directories.


Malicious PowerShell Activity

Detect offensive cmdlets (e.g., Invoke-Mimikatz, DownloadString).

Coverage:

  • OS: Windows.

  • Events: PowerShell script block logging (Event ID 4104) or Cmdlets (Event ID 4103).

  • Logic:

    • Match cmdlets against frameworks like PowerSploit, Empire.

Improvements:

  • Flag obfuscated commands (-EncodedCommand).

  • Look for suspicious Cmdlets (Invoke-WebRequest)


Key Considerations

  • Whitelisting: Exclude benign activity (e.g., admin scripts, 40k daily alerts = useless).

  • Log Coverage: Ensure critical systems (DCs, cloud workloads) feed logs to SIEM. No logs, no detects.

  • Tuning: Start broad, then refine rules using real-world data.

Let me know if you need deeper specifics on any rule! 🔍

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